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Intergovernmental Cooperation: Air Pollution From a Canadian
Perspective
Alex N. Manson*

I t is a pleasure to be back in Ohio. I spent a lot of time here over a

period of twelve years, as you might imagine, talking about acid rain.
So, it is nice to be back here after the fact - after everything seems to be
pointing in the right direction from where we sit on the acid rain issue.
We are putting in place an acid rain program in Canada which has
many similarities to that being put in place in the U.S. In some areas,
Canada is ahead, and in others, Canada is behind. In both cases, this is
largely a reflection of timing or where we are in our decision-making
process. I would just like to point out the differences in where we are
going and would also like to talk from a Canadian perspective about the
Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement. Canada's acid rain program goes
back to the early 1980s. The program is based on targets and schedules.
In the early 1980s, we felt we knew how much acid deposition Mother
Nature could endure in most of Eastern Canada; in other words, we felt
we knew what the "Rolaids" or neutralizing capacity was in the lakes
and the ground and, therefore, how much acid could be dumped on them
without causing any problems. We took these various numbers to get
kind of a patchwork mosaic of what Mother Nature can put up with, and
we started running our atmospheric models. We, in essence, ran the
models backwards, saying if a certain amount of acid deposition could be
tolerated, then what were the emissions levels that could be tolerated
from various parts of Canada, and also, how much pollution could we
tolerate coming across the border from the United States?
We came up with two requirements relatively quickly. One was the
need to cut our own sulfur dioxide emissions about in half from what
they were in 1980. The other was the need to roughly cut in half the
amount of sulfur dioxide flowing across the border from the United
States into Canada. We took that as the departure point for the design of
the specifics of what needed to happen in Canada.
The process of cutting in half Canadian emissions was then to allocate a number of provincial emission caps, which yielded an acceptable
cap in Eastern Canada. The individual caps vary greatly, depending on
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the 1980 provincial emission levels where emission sources are located
with respect to sensitive areas and the costs of emission reductions. Consequently, some of the provinces have relatively high emission ceilings,
while others have very low emission ceilings. Within each of the provinces, the emission cap is distributed.
When this program was put into place in the early 1980s, Canada
had what might be called an early version of an emission trading system.
For example, within individual provinces, individual utilities plants were
not given specific emission limits. Rather, the utilities system was given a
system-wide emission limit, and the company would determine how it
wished to distribute the emissions through its system. Even sources like
large smelters were not given a specific emission limit for each process
within the facility; they were instead given a big bubble to put over the
smelter and the requirement, "Thou shall emit no more than X out of the
smelter complex."
The actions required in Eastern Canada to cut our emissions in half
by 1994 are now eighty-five to ninety percent complete.
We learned a few things in the process of putting that program in
place. One of them - and I think the United States has probably
learned the same lesson in the U.S. with the Clean Air Act - is that the
more flexibility we give people in terms of responding to requirements,
the cheaper things can be done. By 1994, we should see that the total
cost of cutting our emissions in half in Eastern Canada is about twentyfive to thirty percent of the amount we estimated in the early 1980s. This
will largely be because nobody is doing what we thought they were going
to do, or what they thought they were going to do when we were allocating the specific emission reduction caps.
The types of process changes and efforts being undertaken with respect to smelters are just completely different from anything we thought
of in the early 1980s. Inco is a classic example. Inco is a huge copper/nickel smelter in Sudbury. It was the largest single source of sulfur
dioxide emissions in the Western World, and possibly in the whole
world. In the late 1960s, it was emitting 2.25 million tons of sulfur dioxide a year. Inco took steps in the 1970s to begin the cleanup process, but
in the mid 1980s, as a result of requirements in our acid rain program, it
decided to completely revamp the flow sheet in the smelter. By 1994,
Inco will be containing about ninety-two to ninety-three percent of the
sulfur dioxide from the smelter. Inco will cut its energy utilization by 60
percent. When it gets this finished, it is going to be the lowest cost nickel
producer in the world again. By a little bit of flexibility and thinking
about how to get things done, Inco has been able to not only clean up its
Sudbury smelter, but do so in a very profitable way. Inco is probably our
best success story from a sulfur dioxide perspective. There are others,
but they are not quite as large.
The Canadian program was initiated in Eastern Canada. We did
this because, as I said previously, Eastern Canada is where Mother Na-
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ture failed to leave behind enough "Rolaids" after the last Ice Age. We
were not terribly concerned about acidification in Western Canada.
However, in any negotiation and discussion, there is give and take. We
agreed to expand our sulfur dioxide program into a national program.
We also agreed to some requirements for continuous emission monitoring as well as visibility, and for preventing deterioration of air quality in
special areas such as national parks. The latter two requirements were
not new, as we already had the basic requirements under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act.
Canada's acid rain control program calls for a 2.3 million metric ton
emissions cap in the East to be attained by 1994. This cap will be maintained in Eastern Canada through the year 2000. In 2000, parallel with
the national program in the United States, Canada will switch over to a
3.2 million metric ton national cap, which is the permanent cap as set in
the Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement.
I want to digress for a moment. One of the problems that we face in
Canada, which I am sure is one that people face in the United States as
well, is that the business community is not terribly amused when the acid
rain squad knocks at the door and says, "We have a handy-dandy idea
for you to use here to clean up the acid rain problem, and would you just
care to implement it tomorrow?" Just when the engineers are about to
finish that, there is another knock at the door, and this time it is the smog
hit squad with its handy-dandy smog control program. The engineers
get to work again, and lo and behold, things do not quite fit together.
Next, the air toxics guys show up, and they too have a handy-dandy plan
for you, and none of this stuff fits together very well. We are under a fair
bit of pressure to figure out how we can handle all of these things in an
integrated way.
Things like tradeable emission permits and other market-based economic instruments, such as emission taxes or fees, are starting to look
better and better as integrating mechanisms. Canada has a very keen
interest in what is going on with tradeable emission permits in the acid
rain control program of United States Clean Air Act. We hope the U.S.
is successful, so we can see how it might be used in Canada.
I would now like to spend a few minutes looking at the Canada-U.S.
Air Quality Agreement from a Canadian perspective. For us, there are
five or six features of the Agreement that are quite important and I think
useful.
The first is that the Agreement establishes a kind of behavioral standard between Canada and the United States. The Agreement defines
what transboundary air pollution is, and it basically says one country
does not have the right to cause damage in the other from transboundary
air pollution. This establishes a yardstick by which we can measure
whether we are behaving as good neighbors.
The Agreement certainly codified the actions that we felt are neces-
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sary to solve the acid rain problem. The amendments to the U.S. Clean
Air Act, we believe, are exactly what was needed in concert with our
own program to essentially eliminate the acid deposition damage in Eastern Canada in due course. If we take the 10 million ton reduction in
emissions, and look at how we suspect things will shape up in terms of
allocations and trading, we believe the transboundary flow will be cut by
slightly more than fifty percent. Thus, codifying something like that was
quite important to us. We think that it is a permanent solution, and the
Agreement essentially makes it such.
Nitrogen oxide emission reductions are also important. We were
slightly behind the United States in terms of new motor vehicle emissions
standards. The Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement basically put us
back on the same track again.
Another important feature from our perspective is that the Agreement provides the means or the vehicle by which to deal with other issues. We started negotiations on the acid rain issue with our first formal
meetings in October 1978, and it was March 1991 when the ink dried on
the Agreement. We hope that the processes and mechanisms established
in the Agreement result in the resolution of other issues in less than the
thirteen years it took to deal with acid rain. From a process perspective,
we think we have something that will benefit us in the future.
Having to report regularly on progress is a very important feature of
the Agreement. The best judge of how well we are doing is a well-informed public. Reporting to that public on a regular basis is what keeps
our feet to the fire in terms of getting things done.
It is also important that the Agreement contains means of settling
disputes, not only narrow legalistic disputes over whether somebody is
doing exactly what the Agreement says they should do, but also policy
disputes, where even though somebody might be honoring the letter of
the law, his actions are not really within the spirit or intent of the Agreement. There are mechanisms in the Agreement that can bring Canada
and the United States to the table if we have disagreements over the specifics of whether we are generally headed in the direction that the philosophy of the Agreement intends.
Cooperative research and monitoring is another very important feature of the Agreement. There are times when I think that the acid rain
issue probably bred as much misinformation as information on both sides
of the border. There were people in Canada that thought Eastern Canada was going to dissolve and disappear into the Atlantic Ocean. There
were people in the United States who believed in the duck-dung theory of
acid rain - that the acidification of all these lakes was due to the droppings of ducks flying overhead. Cooperative research and monitoring
will help. Rather than arguing over whose dog is bigger, we can spend
our efforts ensuring that our dogs do not bite one other. Cooperative
research and monitoring is also important from the perspective of saving
money. By undertaking some tasks cooperatively, we should be able to
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become more cost-effective than we could by doing those tasks separately
in each nation.
I would like to outline where I see things going in the future. This
will not be the opinion of the Government of Canada, but rather my
personal opinion of what is yet to come.
Under the Agreement, we must complete the implementation of our
acid rain control programs. The next two issues that I think will probably come up under the Agreement are smog and air toxics. Both are
existing problems of which both Canada and the United States are aware.
They are transboundary problems, and in due course we are going to be
at the table talking about not only what we need to do as individual
nations, but also what we need to do collectively to deal with those
issues.
There is considerable interest in both Canada and the U.S. in adding
to our policy instrument tool kit. If both Canada and the United States
start using tradeable emission permits and other market mechanisms to
deal with issues, we are going to have to consider the implications of
these approaches in the transboundary context. It may become one of
the next growth opportunities for the legal profession. We must begin
discussing how to deal with potential problems now, not just in a Canada-U.S. context, but also in the global context.
There are a few points on the road where we may encounter some
difficulties. Canada's air quality standard for smog or ozone is considerably more stringent than that of the United States. Ours is eighty-two
parts per billion, and yours is about 120. I think both are based on the
same science. The difference is a decision on what is appropriate from a
public policy perspective. It is an issue that will come up when we start
talking about smog under the Agreement, and we will have to find a way
to deal with it.
On the air toxics side, the approach being taken by the U.S. Clean
Air Act is quite different from the approach being taken in Canada. I
only read your legislation and do not pretend to know all off the intricacies of it, but it seems that Congress has deemed a number of substances
or groups of substances to be toxic. Accordingly, the United States is
putting in place some programs to deal with those things. In Canada, we
are still going through a process of assessing whether or not things are
toxic. Canada will be slightly behind on this one, so there may be some
people in the United States who will want to debate whether Canada is
moving fast enough in the air toxics area. I suspect that this will be a
potentially difficult issue with which to deal.
As a final comment, I think that targets and schedules may also
become a trouble spot, for it strikes me that Canada and the United
States see things differently. Our view is that agreements should have
environmental quality-based quotas, targets and schedules. The view in
the United States seems to be to incorporate the standards of perform-
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ance that are in place in each of our two countries, or in a number of
countries. Where one sits on this issue likely depends on how one feels
about the role of environmental equality and health and safety standards
in terms of economic competitiveness, etc. This will be another issue
which will remain on the table in the context of the Canada-U.S. Air
Quality Agreement and other agreements for a while to come.

